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This paper demonstrates how a ‘modest’ financial shock can trigger a deep recession. We
suggest that two factors can help generate it. The first is that the economy has accumulated
a moderately high level of private debt by the time the adverse shock occurs. The second
factor is when monetary policy, set under discretion, is restricted by the zero lower bound.
These factors can result in a sharp contraction in output. Perhaps surprisingly, we use a
standard DSGE model with financial frictions along the lines of Jermann and Quadrini (2012)
to demonstrate this result and so do not need to rely on dysfunctional interbank markets.
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1 Introduction
A decade has passed since the onset of the Great Recession in 2008, but for a number of economies
recovery was slow and fragile. In fact, some worry it ushered in an era of permanently lower trend
growth. The origins of some of those concerns are reflected in Figure 1, which plots GDP growth
in all post-war recessions for the UK, US and Japan.1 The Great Recession stands out for at least
two reasons – it was both deep and protracted: First, in each country the average recession was
not as deep as was experienced in the Great Recession. Second, the average recession delivered
its lowest output growth rate at the onset of the recession (period zero in the figure); thereafter,
economies tended return to their previous growth trajectory within one to two quarters. In
contrast, following the onset of the Great Recession growth reached its minimum some two to
four quarters later and growth persisted at the lower end of the typical post-war experience;
recovery was slow by recent historical standards.
A great deal of research has followed trying to document further and explain these develop-
ments, in particular the unexpectedly sharp and prolonged reduction in output. For example
For example Boissay et al. (2016) consider about 200 events and identify this broad pattern,
see Table 1. Duncan and Nolan (2018) is a detailed review of that literature. They show that,
whatever controversies remain amongst scholars of financial crises, there is a widespread con-
sensus that recessions following banking and financial crises are typically worse than ‘normal’
recessions. For example, Reinhart and Rogo↵ (2009, 2013) observe that financial crises result in
deeper recessions, with contractions in economic activity reaching 9% in some severe episodes.
This is substantially more than output reductions more commonly encountered during ordinary
recessions. It has also been observed that financial crises often follow periods of strong credit
growth. Working with long-run data, Schularick and Taylor (2012) argue that credit growth is
a powerful predictor of financial crises. However, such credit booms may not on their own nec-
essarily cause financial crises; some periods of high credit growth do not appear to end badly.
Gorton and Ordoñez (2020) argue that credit booms typically start with positive productivity
growth, which subsequently falls much faster during credit booms that end badly.
The role of ‘financial frictions’ in explaining these observed patterns has been identified as
central by many researchers and policymakers and there is now a large and growing body of
research which seeks to provide quantitative macroeconomic models to explain how seemingly
1
Episods in Figure 1 can be identified in the available data series in the FRED FRB St. Louis database. The
data series are NAEXKP01JPQ657S (Japan 1960Q1-2014Q4), NAEXKP01GBQ652S PCH (UK 1955Q1-2014Q4)
and GDPC1 PCH (US 1947Q1-2015Q1). All series are seasonally adjusted.
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well-functioning economies might ‘unexpectedly’ end up with financial crises. The role of financial
shocks in generating deep recessions is discussed in Nolan and Thoenissen (2009) , Christiano et
al. (2014), Mumtaz and Zanetti (2016) and Merola (2015) to mention only a few. Many develop
non-trivial models of financial intermediaries that help to explain how even relatively ‘small’
shocks can have large e↵ects. For example, Boissay et al. (2016) develop a model of interbank
market which can come to a complete still and demonstrate how an ‘innocuous’ sequences of
positive productivity shocks can expose economies to rare but deep financial crises. Jermann and
Quadrini (2012) propose a simpler, linear, macroeconomic model with financial frictions which
is quite closely aligned with the US data since the early 1990s, although it fails to replicate the
large reduction in output and hours worked observed during the Great Recession.
Figure 1: Post-war recessions in the US, Japan and UK

































average recession Great recession
Note: The period zero corresponds to the start of each of post-war recessions.
Table 1: Statistics on recessions
Financial Other All
No. of Events 41 155 196
Frequency 2.36 8.93 11.29
Duration (years) 2.32 1.65 1.79
Magnitude  p,ty,% -6.84 -3.75 -4.40
Credit boom  p 2,pk,% 4.55 0.18 1.13
Note:  p,tx ( p 2,px) is the percentage change of variable x from peak to trough (respectively
from peak-2 years to peak) where y is output and k is a measure of credit per capita. The table
is based on data in Boissay et al. (2016).
In this paper we argue that simple linear models with financial frictions are nevertheless
capable of generating quantitatively large adjustments in output following small financial shocks
once a couple of important mechanisms are activated. Specifically, we demonstrate how a simple
log-linear DSGE model with financial frictions à la Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and with
nominal rigidities à la Rotemberg (1983) is capable of generating the observed deep recessions
2
that are present in the data. In our model, the recession is triggered by a small ‘capital quality’
shock which accelerates capital obsolescence (Gertler et al. 2012) and reveals that the existing
level of debt is out of kilter with the stock of underlying capital. The level of accumulated debt
may become ‘too high’ just like prior to the Great Recession in many developed countries, see
e.g. Schularick and Taylor (2012). We demonstrate how this measure of ‘overlending’ can lead to
recession, in line with the important and insightful analysis in Jermann and Quadrini (2012) who
identify an increase in probability of default on the existing corporate debt during the financial
crisis of 2008. The implied reduction in the stock of debt requires substantial deleveraging in
the economy. Following the shock, the reduction in debt presages a fall in the capital stock. In
turn the lower capital stock requires less finance and these two e↵ects reinforce one another and
the sluggish adjustment of both stocks results in a much greater reduction of capital, output and
hours worked. As a result, output falls substantially. Moreover, if monetary policy is conducted
under discretion (as argued in Chen et al. 2017) then optimal monetary policy will seek to lower
interest rates to below the zero lower bound. If that constraint is binding, higher-than-desired
real interest rates disrupt the process of deleveraging, and firms have to reduce labour and capital
by much more, contributing further to the depth of the ensuing recession (see also Francis et al.
2020).
The ability of our model to generate quantitatively substantial reductions in output is inter-
esting as some have argued that the onset of the crisis was essentially an adverse credit event
(see e.g., Taylor, 2009), whilst others attribute a large role to adverse selection and moral hazard
problems in the interbank/money markets (Boissay et al., 2016). No doubt both explanations
played some role, but a contribution of this paper is simply to argue that standard models of
financial frictions explain more of the initial contraction at the onset of the Great Recession than
perhaps is generally realized.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the model. We discuss
the empirical evidence and the corresponding calibration of the model in section 3. In section
4 we discuss the sequence of policy experiments, which show how to generate stylized, post-
crisis dynamics like those with which we motivated this paper. Section 5 concludes and notes an
important aspect of the data that still cannot be explained by the model in its current formulation.
2 The Model
We present a simple variant of an increasingly familiar type of a model with firms’ borrowing
constraints à la Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and with nominal rigidities à la Rotemberg (1983).
3
The economy is populated by households and firms. Firms use labor and capital to produce
di↵erentiated goods. Firms issue equity and debt and use intra-period loans to finance working
capital. Firms face credit restrictions because financial intermediaries fear they may not repay
those loans. The detailed model of the economy is presented in this section.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of homogeneous households of measure one. Households are indexed by j.















where Et indicates expectations conditional on information available at time t; 0 <   < 1 is the
discount factor; Ct and nt are a consumption aggregate and labor supply in period t, respectively.
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where   is the coe cient of relative risk aversion,  is the elasticity of labour supply and ↵ is a
‘preference’ parameter. The households are assumed to hold equities and corporate bonds. The
household’s budget constraint in real terms can be written as:
wtn
j
t + bt + st (dt + p̄t) +  t + Tt =
bt+1
1 + rt
+ st+1p̄t + C
j
t (2)
where wt is the real wage rate, rt is the real interest rate, bt is the real value of one-period bonds
held by the households, st is equity holdings, dt is the real dividend, p̄t is the real market price
of shares, Pt is the price of goods, Tt is a government transfer and  t is real profit from the
ownership of final goods firms.
The standard maximization of intertemporal utility (1) subject to the sequence of budget
constraints (2), yields the following system of first order conditions:












+ st+1p̄t + C
j
t + Tt   st (dt + p̄t)  wtn
j
t    t. (6)
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with respect to Cjt and n
j
t respectively. The
above equations reflect optimal decisions with respect to labour supply, intertemporal resource
allocation, equity purchases and bond purchases.
2.2 Firms
There are two types of firms in this economy. There are flexible price intermediate goods producers
and monopolistically competitive final goods retailers. We discuss each in turn.
2.2.1 Intermediate goods producers
Intermediate goods producers have access to a standard production technology
yt = F (e






where A is a constant productivity shifter, ezt is stochastic productivity common to all firms, nt
is the labor input which can be flexibly changed at time t, kt is the capital stock determined at
time t 1 and ✓ is the capital share. Capital in process for period t+1 is transformed into capital
for production after the realization of a multiplicative shock to capital quality, #t+1:
kt+1 = ((1   ) kt + It)#t+1 (8)
where It is investment and   is the depreciation rate. Following Gertler et al. (2012),2 we
introduce the capital quality shock, #t, which is an i.i.d. process allowing for occasional disasters
in the form of sharp contractions in the quality of capital as we describe later. The random
variable #t captures some form of economic obsolescence, as opposed to physical depreciation.
This disaster shock serves to reveal ‘overlending’ once the quality of underlying capital has fallen.
Firms use equity and debt to finance their operations. They prefer debt, bt, to equity because
of debt’s tax advantage, see Jermann and Quadrini (2012). The budget constraint in real terms
can be written as:
XtF (e
zt , kt, nt) +
bt+1
Rt




is the relative price of produced intermediate goods, Pt is price of final goods,
Rt = 1 + rt(1  ⌧) is the after tax return on bonds and  t is the real payout to shareholders.
We assume that firms raise funds via intertemporal debt, bt, and an intra-period loan, Lt, to
finance working capital. They pay back the interest-free intra-period loan at the end of the period.
2
See also Gertler and Karadi (2011), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), Gourio (2012) and Afrin (2017).
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Specifically, firms start the period with intertemporal debt bt and they choose labour, investment
in capital, the dividend, dt, and new intertemporal debt, bt+1, before producing. Therefore the
payments to workers wtnt, suppliers of investment goods It, shareholders  t and bondholders bt,
are made ahead of the realization of revenues. The loan will cover these costs as follows (in real
terms):




Combining this constraint with the budget constraint yields total liquid real resources of the firm
Lt = XtF (ezt , kt, nt) which can be used to repay the loan at the end of the period.
The ability of firms to borrow is bounded because they may (choose to) default on their debt.
Default arises after the realization of revenues but before repaying the intra-period loan. The
total real liabilities of the firm at that time are Lt+
bt+1
Rt
, as it will need to pay back the loan and
redeem all the bonds. The total liquid real resources of the firm, Lt, can be ‘diverted’ by the firm
and so cannot be recovered by the lender after a default. Then, the only asset available to the
lender is capital, kt+1. Following Jermann and Quadrini (2012), we assume that the liquidation
value of capital is unknown at the moment of contracting the loan. With probability ⌅e⇠t the
full value of kt+1 will be recovered, but with probability 1   ⌅e⇠t the liquidation value is zero.







  XtF (ezt , kt, nt). (10)
Whilst ⌅e⇠t is stochastic and depends on (uncertain) markets conditions, it is the same for
all firms. This variable is what is identified as a ‘financial shock’.
The transmission of financial shocks is a↵ected by the ease with which firms can switch
between debt and equity. There are any number of reasons why firms in reality are unable easily
to substitute between such sources of external finance (see Frank and Goyal 2008). In any case,
one way to regulate that flexibility in the model is to introduce an adjustment cost to dividend
payments. That cost reflects a rigidity that a↵ects the substitution between debt and equity. We
assume that the firm’s nominal payout to shareholders is assumed to be subject to a quadratic
adjustment cost set on the nominal payo↵:




(1 + ⇡t)  1
◆2
dt
where    0 is a dividend adjustment parameter and ⇡t = PtPt 1   1 is the inflation rate. The
exact functional form of the adjustment cost matters less, as the flexibility can be regulated by the
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appropriate choice of parameter . Our preferred functional form introduces history dependence in
dividend payments; another possible way to model it would be to penalize deviations of dividends
from the steady state (and both have some support, see Frank and Goyal 2008).
Each firm maximizes profit subject to budget constraint (9) and enforcement constraint (10),
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where m0,t = m0,t 1mt 1,t =  t
Uc(ct,nt)
Uc(c0,n0)
is the stochastic discount factor, and µt and  t are
Lagrange multipliers.
The first order conditions include (9), (10) and derivatives with respect to nt, kt+1, bt+1, and
dt:




































(1 + ⇡t)  1
◆2!
,
where Fn and Fk are derivatives of F (ezt , kt, nt) with respect to n and k. Absent distortions due
to the tax code and on dividend payouts, and the role of capital as collateral, the debt-equity mix
would be a matter of irrelevance in the maximization of firm value; the quantity of investment
could be decided with no mind to the debt-equity mix. Whilst the tax code would induce firms
only to issue debt, the risk of that debt not being honored provides a role for equity. Moreover,
the quadratic adjustment cost on dividends provides yet another consideration on the debt-equity
mix. A simple way to summarize what is happening, then, is that bigger firms (those with a larger
capital stock) can take on more debt other things constant, and they will try to smooth dividend
payments. Both features have been observed in the data.
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2.2.2 Retailers
Firms’ pricing decisions are subject to nominal rigidities à la Rotemberg (1983). We take the
standard approach, see e.g. Gertler and Karadi (2011). Each final good producer i buys interme-
diate goods at price Pmt and transforms them into final goods. That good may also be costlessly
transformed into capital. It sets its optimal price pit and produces quantity y
i
t. The firm faces











Here the elasticity of substitution between any pair of goods is given by " > 1. The firm chooses

























































where ! > 0 is a price adjustment cost parameter and ⌧s denotes the rate at which sales-revenue
is taxed.
As is well known, the aggregate implications of that pricing decision give rise to a Phillips-type
relation:
(⇡t + 1)⇡t =
(1  ") (1  ⌧s) + "Xt
!




where the sales revenue tax can be chosen to o↵set the monopolistic markup.
Finally, the profit  t in the household budget constraint can be found from the aggregation
of firms’ budget constraints:







The role of the government in this economy is limited. The government collects interest rate
taxes, pays a labor subsidy designed to eliminate the monopolistic distortion, and rebates its
revenue as a lump-sum transfer to households:
rt⌧bt + yt⌧s = Tt.
The government budget is therefore balanced at all times.
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2.3 Private Sector Equilibrium and Market Clearing
After some substitutions, the system (9), (10), (11)-(14), (15), (3)-(6) collapses to the following
system:
0 = ( t   µt)XtFn(ezt , kt, nt)   twt; (17)































































= bt + wtnt +
kt+1
#t+1






(1 + ⇡t)  1
◆2!
 Xtyt;(22)
(1 + ⇡t)⇡t =


























Finally, the resource constraint yields
yt = Ct +
kt+1
#t+1












and system (17)-(26) determines the private sector equilibrium { t, µt, Xt, Ct, kt,⇡t, nt, dt, wt, bt}1t=0
given policy instruments it and ⌧t and three exogenous processes #t, zt and ⇠t.
2.4 Linearization
We linearize system (17)-(26) around the e cient steady state, which is the flexile price equilib-
rium without financial and capital quality shocks. Specifically, for every variable Vt we define
v̂t = log
Vt




t is the log-
deviation from the e cient steady state. The full linearized system is reported in he appendix.
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2.5 Policy














Thus we assume that the policymaker has objectives defined simply over inflation and output.
Such an objective has long been of interest to researchers in applied and theoretical analyses
of (monetary) policy problems. Of course, that assumption is open to some obvious criticisms,
which we readily acknowledge; but we also note that this policy objective has significant empirical
support, a recent discussion can be found in Chen et al. (2017).3
Importantly, note that the interest rate may be constrained by the ZLB. We compute numer-
ically the implications of such a restriction using the approach developed in Laseen and Svensson
(2011) and extended to the case of discretion. We detail in an Appendix B to this paper how to
do that extension as this may be of additional interest.
3 Calibration
The model is calibrated to a quarterly frequency. We fix   = 0.9825. The capital depreciation
rate is set to   = 0.025. The capital ratio in the production function is set to ✓ = 0.36, and
the mean value of A is normalized to 1. The tax wedge which introduces, ceteris paribus, an
advantage of debt over equity is determined to be ⌧ = 0.35, and the dividend adjustment cost
parameter set to  = 0.146 as in Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
We calibrate the steady state debt to output ratio to match the data. The quarterly ratio of
debt to output for the non-financial business sector is 3.25 over the sample period 1984:I-2010:II,
see the top panel in Figure 2. In order to match that, we set the steady state value of the financial
variable, ⌅, to 0.1779.4
Parameters of the household utility function are determined as follows. The calibration of
the Frisch elasticity of substitution in labor supply,  , is assumed to be equal to 1 and the risk
aversion parameter is   = 1. The relative weight on the disutility of labour, ↵ = 1.8834, is chosen
so as to set steady state hours worked equal to 0.3.
We calibrate the measure of price stickiness, ! = 80, in a way that corresponds to the
probability of firms changing prices every 3 quarters (that is, in a corresponding Calvo model).
3
See also estimation of policy objectives in e.g. Dennis (2006), Ilbas (2010) and Givens (2012).
4
Data sources: NIPA and FoF tables. The calculations follow Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
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Figure 2: Historical data in the US
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The elasticity of substitution between any pair of goods " is equal to 11 in steady state which
gives a 10% mark up.
Parameters of the policy objective function are chosen to be { = 0.5, see Chen et al. (2017).5
Calibration of technology and financial shocks is taken from Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
Specifically, technology and financial shocks ẑt and ⇠̃t are correlated AR(1) processes with tran-
sition matrix [0.9457, -0.0091; 0.0321, 0.9703] and standard errors of innovations of 0.0045 and
0.0098 respectively, see Table 2 in Jermann and Quadrini (2012). Following Gertler et al. (2012)
we assume that the capital quality shock #t follows an i.i.d. process and allow for randomly
arriving rare ‘disasters’. Specifically, #t = #̃t#̃Jt with #̃t = #̄e
✏t and #̃Jt = e
⌘t where ✏t is normally
distributed, ✏t ⇠ N(0, 1) and ⌘t is binomially distributed
⌘t =
⇢
  (1  q)  with prob q
q  with prob 1  q
where   is a positive number so that the disaster innovation   (1  q)  is negative. The mean
of ⌘t is zero and the variance is q (1  q) 2.We calibrate these parameters q = 0.01,   = 0.001.
Parameter #̄ = 1.
4 Discussion
Figures 3 are taken from Jermann and Quadrini (2012). Its top panel demonstrates the ability
of an RBC-type model with financial frictions to explain the three episodes of recessions. As the
authors note, it is evident that the model fails to account for the depth of the Great Recession.
Its bottom panel identifies innovations to technology and financial shocks around the time of the
largest fall in output. Specifically, innovations to productivity seem to be negative, around one
standard error in size, i.e. about -0.005. The innovation to the financial shock process is about
-0.025. We call them ‘crisis innovations’ and use them further in our discussion below.
In this paper we claim that deep recessions can still be generated by a very similar model. To
support this claim we run three numerical experiments. We start with an interesting experiment
in Jermann and Quadrini (2012) with negative initial impact of technology and financial shocks,
determined by the ‘crisis innovations’. We confirm that the model, indeed, generates only a
moderate reduction in output. We then demonstrate that if a capital quality shock happens at
about the same time, it creates a situation of ‘overlending’ which requires greater deleveraging
(and possibly implies an increase in probability of default, so triggering a financial shock). In this
5
The results are robust to the wide range of parameters { between zero and one.
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Figure 3: Response of Jermann and Quadrini (2012) model to Financial Shocks
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in debt flows generated in response to productivity shocks are also quite different 
from the data (see lower panels of Figure 3). The properties of the model with 
financial frictions are further illustrated by the impulse responses to a one-time 
productivity shock reported in Figure 6.
Financial Shocks.—Figure 4 plots the responses of output, hours, and financial 
flows to the sequence of financial shocks. With financial shocks only, the dynamics 
of output and labor are quite close to the data. In particular, we see a boom in output 
and hours during the 1990s. Furthermore, financial shocks generate sharp drops in 
output and labor in all three recessions: 1990–1991, 2001, and 2008–2009. The drop 
in hours generated by financial shocks in the recent recession is more than half the 
decline in the data.
The performance of the model in response to financial shocks relies on the impact 
that these shocks have on the demand for labor. As shown in the upper right panel, 
financial shocks generate large fluctuations in working hours. Also, they generate 
large drops in labor during the three recessions and an upward trend during the 1990s.
The importance of the financial shocks for the demand of labor can be seen from 
the first-order condition (4), which for convenience we rewrite here, 
  F n (z, k, n) =  w ⋅ ( 1 _ 1 −  #  φ d (d ) ).
Figure 4. Response to Financial Shocks Only
85(II) 88(I) 90(IV) 93(IV) 96(IV) 99(IV) 02(IV) 05(IV) 08(IV) 85(II) 88(I) 90(IV) 93(IV) 96(IV) 99(IV) 02(IV) 05(IV) 08(IV)























































Source: Figure 4 and Figure 2 in Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
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case a deeper recession follows. These events may trigger an aggressive relaxation in monetary
policy; indeed the optimal nominal interest rate may be negative – below the ZLB. In the final
experiment we demonstrate how that ZLB on interest rates reduces output even further.
4.1 Capital quality shock and ‘overlending’
We start with the baseline scenario, where the economy is initially in the steady state but then it
is hit by both technology and financial shocks with ‘crisis innovations’. This scenario is plotted
with solid lines in Figure 4. The dynamics of the model economy is mostly a↵ected by the negative
financial shock. Such a shock reduces the probability that, in the event of default, banks will be
able to recover in liquidation the full value of capital. Banks lend to firms at the beginning of the
period, so that firms are able to pay wages. As the financial shock reduces the probability of that
debt being honored, the amount of bank lending falls. Firms which are not able to obtain funds
up front have to delever or reduce production. Firms reduce their labour demand, produce less
output and also pay lower wages. The equilibrium prices of intermediate and final goods both
fall as a result of lower income and lower demand. Firms also reduce the amount of borrowing.
Both constraints for firms are tightened, as the values of the Lagrange multipliers indicate.
This is, of course, di↵erent from the scenario studied in Jermann and Quadrini (2012) where
the ‘crisis innovations’ further amplify already existing deviation of the economy from the steady
state created by highly persistent autoregressive shocks. Nevertheless, in our case output and
labour fall by about 2%, which is significant, but still short of the magnitude generated by the
model reported in Figure 3.
In response to lower inflation and output the central bank reduces the nominal interest rate
su ciently to guarantee a reduction in the real rate. Initially, consumption rises just above the
steady state, but then falls consistently with the low real interest rate.
Lower interest rates also make it easier for firms to meet obligations arising from the existing
stock of corporate debt, and so help to reduce the debt stock relatively quickly. Output falls by
less than wages and so firms’ profits fall as do their dividend payout.
We now allow for a ‘rare’ capital quality shock to occur; this happens in the initial period of
time. Our calibration implies that the level of # is reduced by 0.1%. The quality of capital shock
has a negative impact in two ways. First, this shock has a direct impact on the productivity of
capital in the production of output. Second, it also causes lenders to reconsider the e↵ectiveness
of capital in its role as collateral. When the quality of capital falls, the existing stock of debt
remains unchanged. In other words, agents suddenly realize that the level of accumulated debt
14
Figure 4: Productivity and financial shocks with ‘crisis innovations’. Percentage deviations from
the initial (steady) state under discretionary monetary policy.
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Figure 5: Commitment vs. Discretion. The scenario with all three shocks, percentage deviation
from the steady state.








































































































































































is excessive in comparison to the existing capital stock. Such a situation in our model may be
considered to be one of ‘overlending’ and is close to what Gorton and Ordoñez (2020) call a
‘bad credit boom’ 6. In any case, the stock of debt needs to be brought back in line with the
underlying capital, so sharper deleveraging is required. As before, the scenario assumes that
both technology and financial shocks apply. This allows us to quantify the impact of the capital
quality shock. Also, although the model treats all shocks in a similar way – they are exogenous
– a more elaborate model may provide a link from the capital quality shock to an increase in the
probability of default.
This scenario is plotted in Figure 4 with the dashed lines. The required deleveraging brings
the level of debt down towards the steady state level of new quality-adjusted capital. The value of
capital is re-evaluated instantaneously, while the amount of debt in circulation is predetermined
and is about 10% above the new steady state, consistent with data presented in the first panel
in Figure 2. This, now excessively high, initial level of debt requires greater deleveraging than in
the default scenario. Lower debt reduces the capital stock and the lower capital stock requires
less financing. These two e↵ects reinforce each other, and as a result there is greater reduction
in labour demand and wages, and much lower inflation. The interest rate falls by more, not only
because it tries to stabilize inflation, but because it also helps to stabilize debt–and thus all policy-
relevant variables–faster. Adding a rare capital quality shock, therefore, results in reduction in
output of about 6%, which is much more consistent with the evidence presented in Figure 3.
The type of optimal monetary policy does not a↵ect the resulting reduction in output, see
Figure 5, which compares policies under discretion and commitment. Although adjustments
of real variables are very similar, commitment policy does not allow the interest rate to move
below the ZLB, unlike discretionary policy. Most empirical analysis to date suggest the US Fed
operates under discretion rather than commitment, see e.g. Dennis (2006), Givens (2012), Chen
et al. (2017). Therefore, next we discuss the implications of the ZLB on the dynamics of the
economy under discretionary monetary policy.
4.2 ‘Overlending’ with interest rate above the ZLB
The e↵ect of the ZLB is illustrated in Figure 6. We compare two scenarios. The first one,
represented by the solid lines, is the case of ‘unconstrained discretion’ with the three shocks
discussed in the section above. That scenario assumes that the interest rate can move below
6
They argue that what distinguished good booms from bad booms is essentially that under the former but
not the later productivity in the economy grows more persistently. As a result, good booms end without wider
economic hardship.
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the ZLB. The second scenario, represented by the dashed lines, is where such movements are
prohibited. Following Erceg and Linde (2014) and Bodenstein et al. (2013) we use the algorithm
in Laseen and Svensson (2011) which was developed to solve linear-quadratic models with a ZLB
on the policy instrument. The algorithm assumes that the private sector anticipates policy shocks
to a policy rule so that the actual and expected paths of the interest rate do not go below the
ZLB. Laseen and Svensson (2011) develop the algorithm for a commitment policy. We extend
the algorithm to the case of discretionary policy which we set out in the Appendix. We also
perform iteration steps described in Bodenstein et al. (2013) to endogenize the duration of the
ZLB episode contingent on the realization of particular shocks.
Figure 6 suggests that when the optimal interest rate is constrained by the ZLB, the recession
is deeper. Since the interest rate remains ‘too high’, debt deleveraging is too slow. The high
interest rate also results in lower consumption and lower demand. Firms attempt to accommo-
date the reduction in demand and the need for deleveraging with reductions in both factors of
production. Both bond and capital stocks fall quickly and by large amounts. Wages and labor
fall instantaneously.
As capital and labour fall, the production of intermediate goods falls too. In the initial period,
the price of intermediate goods (marginal cost) rises to compensate for the sharp reduction in
supply of intermediate goods and relatively buoyant demand from final goods producers. As a
result, inflation does not fall as far as it otherwise would had the ZLB not been present. However,
expected inflation remains negative. Together with a relatively high nominal interest rate, that
means there is only a relatively small reduction in the real interest rate and that consumption
falls only slowly through time. As a result, we observe a reduction in consumption and investment
reflecting the reduction in output in the first few periods following the shock.
When the financial shock occurs both constraints tighten and monetary policy is loosened.
However, the interest rate cannot fall by as much as the policymaker would like as the ZLB is
encountered. The enforcement constraint is tightened much more than in the ‘unconstrained’
policy scenario, see Figure 6. However, once the initial-periods capital and debt de-accumulation
is done, the constraint is weakened substantially. There is no further need to reduce bonds and
capital quickly, and no need to restrain investment as much. Investment remains negative, but
somewhat higher than in the first several periods. Intermediate goods firms increase output, and
the price of intermediate goods falls to equalize demand and supply. Therefore, inflation falls as
costs fall. Inflation is negative and it is optimal to keep the interest rate below the steady state
level in order to stabilize the economy, but the interest rate does not need to be below the ZLB.
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Figure 6: The e↵ect of ZLB.
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We show that it is optimal to raise the interest rate slightly above the ZLB. The higher interest
rate increases the real interest rate, but it still remains below the steady state level. As such,
consumption continues falling to match the desired path for capital and supply. At some point
the optimal deleveraging is achieved, the real rate becomes positive, consumption and demand
start rising, prices and inflation rise and the economy converges back on the steady state. To
summarize, constrained monetary intervention results in a deep recession. In our experiment the
reduction in output is nearly double the fall in the previous section and replicates the data in
Figure 3.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we demonstrate how a simple model with borrowing constrained firms is able to
generate quantitatively large reductions in output like those observed following the 2008 financial
crisis. We demonstrate that, in response to a moderate financial shock triggered by a very small
reduction in capital quality, the economy may undergo a very deep recession. If monetary policy
is conducted under discretion, the zero lower bound on interest rate is likely to bind.
The analysis therefore makes two key contribution. First, it shows how in a simple, increas-
ingly familiar framework one may model excessive debt and allow for the potential of ‘small’
shocks to have large e↵ects. And second, it shows how that same framework goes some way to
help understanding the depth of the recession in the face of certain key factors, namely financial
frictions and constraints on monetary policy.
Our research, however, shows that the frictions/model features that help us understand the
depth of the Great Recession do not necessarily help us understand its persistence. Understanding
that feature of the Great Recession, in combination with its ‘initial’ severity remains an urgent
and outstanding research question.
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A Linearized model equations
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B Anticipated ZLB under discretion in LQ models
Laseen and Svensson (2011) propose a convenient algorithm to construct policy projections con-
ditional on anticipated policy rate paths in linearized DSGE models. The algorithm expands the
set of predetermined variables by adding a vector of future policy shocks to a given policy rule,
that satisfies the anticipated policy rate path. Laseen and Svensson (2011) illustrate how to add
an anticipated sequence of shocks to the solution under both commitment and a simple rule. We
extend this algorithm to the case of discretion.7
Our model in equations (27)-(36) can be written in the following state-space form (the problem
is certainty equivalent, so all expectation signs are omitted)
Xt+1 = A11Xt +A12 xt +B1 ut +C"t+1 (37)
Hxt+1 = A21Xt +A22 xt +B2 ut, (38)
where Xt is a n1 vector of predetermined variables; xt is a n2 vector of forward-looking variables;
ut is the control variable, and "t is a vector of zero mean k i.i.d. shocks. Without loss of generality,
the shocks are normalized so that the covariance matrix of "t is the identity matrix, I. Therefore,
the covariance matrix of the shocks to Xt+1 is CC
0
.














The algorithm assumes anticipated shocks and in that it is di↵erent from algorithms employed to solve fully
nonlinear models with occasionaally binding constraints, see e.g. Adam and Billi (2007) and Kim et al. (2010).
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⇤ is a symmetric and positive semi-definite weight matrix and Y s is an nY vector of target
variables









































is partitioned with Xs, xs and us.
Following Laseen and Svensson (2011), we augment the predetermined variables, Xt, in equa-
tions (27)-(36) by incorporating a (T + 1) vector of stochastic shocks, zt ⌘ (zt,t, zt+1,t . . . zt+T,t)0 ,which
denote a projection in period t of future realizations of shocks, zt+⌧,t, ⌧ = 0, 1, ..., T. Furthermore,
we assume that zt,t follows a moving average process




where ⌘t,t s, s = 0, 1, ..T, are zero-mean i.i.d. shocks. For T = 0, zt,t = ⌘t,t. For T > 0, the
stochastic shocks following a moving average process:
zt+⌧,t+1 = zt+⌧,t + ⌘t+⌧,t+1, ⌧ = 1, ..., T
zt+T+1,t+1 = ⌘t+T+1,t+1.




where ⌘t+1 ⌘ (⌘t+1,t+1, ⌘t+2,t+1 . . . ⌘t+T+1,t+1)0 is a (T + 1) vector of i.i.d.shocks and Az is







Our model (37) incorporating the vector of stochastic shocks, zt, is subsequently augmented
into the following state-space form
fXt+1 = eA11fXt + eA12xt + eB1ut + eC"t+1 (39)
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is partitioned with fXs, xs and us.
To impose the ZLB constraint on the nominal interest rate ut = ı̃t, we set the first element









.The projection of the future stochastic shocks is then chosen to ensure that
it > 0, for ⌧ = 0, 1, ..., T.
Suppose that the reaction of the private sector is given by the following linear rule
xt+1 =  NfXt+1, (41)
We can rewrite equation (41) into an equivalent form in terms of predetermined variables and
controls (as did Oudiz and Sachs, 1985) by substituting for fXt+1 using (39):
xt+1 =  NfXt+1 =  N
⇣
eA11fXt + eA12xt + eB1ut
⌘
Combining this with equation (40) we obtain:
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(43)
The policymaker maximizes its objective function with respect to ut, taking the time-consistent
reaction xt as given, and recognizing the dependence of xt on policy ut. We define the following
Lagrangian with constraints capturing the evolution of the state variables in the economy, as well
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+ eA012 s+1 + µs = 0
@Hs
@ s+1
= eA11fXs + eA12xs + eB1us  fXs+1 = 0
@Hs
@µs+1
= xs + JfXs +Kus = 0




⇠s+1 =  P ⇤0fXs  R⇤us,
 A
⇤0
⇠s+1 =  Q⇤fXs   P ⇤us + ⇠s,
fXs+1 = A⇤fXs +B⇤us,
where ⇠s =   s+t s, ⇠s+1 =   s 1+t s+1, and
Q
⇤ = eQXX   eQXxJ   J 0 eQxX + J 0 eQxxJ,
P
⇤ = J 0 eQxxK   eQXxK + ePXu   J 0 ePxu,
R
⇤ = K 0 eQxxK + eR K 0 ePxu   eP 0xuK,
A
⇤ = eA11   eA12J,
B
⇤ = eB1   eA12K.
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It is straightforward to show that system matrices in (45) satisfy the following Riccati equa-
tions describing the solution to the discretionary policy problem.

















To sum up, our ZLB algorithm under discretion constrains the nominal interest rate to remain
at ZLB during the periods where particular shocks drive the nominal interest rate below ZLB,
otherwise the interest rate is not bounded. To endogenize the duration of the ZLB period con-
tingent on particular shocks, we adopt the iteration steps described in Bodenstein et al. (2013).
This procedure initially chooses the periods that ZLB binds by setting a sequence of ⌘t,t s, based
on the periods during which interest rates would fall below ZLB when no such constraint was
imposed. It then revises the sequence of ⌘t,t s to withdraw the ZLB constraint in periods where
the interest rates turn out to be above ZLB in the chosen periods. We find that Bodenstein et
al. (2013)’s iteration steps work well with our model and our ZLB algorithm.
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